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The Divided Labor of Attack Advertising
in Congressional Campaigns
Kenneth M. Miller, University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This article offers a theory of how party networks divide the labor of attacking opponents. Using an extensive data set of
campaign advertising from the 2010 and 2012 congressional elections augmented with Nielsen television ratings data, it
is shown that candidates attack opponents less when supporting outside groups attack more. Due to differences in how
outside groups and candidates attack opponents, when candidates partially outsource attack advertising to independent
expenditure groups, attacks in that campaign become more issue and policy based. Thus, in perhaps an unintended
consequence of the divided labor of attack advertising, outside group involvement makes it more likely that an election
campaign will foster citizen knowledge about policy positions of the candidates.
While independent expenditures have had a rolein US campaigns for many decades, the scale of in-dependent activity has dramatically increased since
the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) and the federal court decision in Speechnow
.org v. FEC, 599 F. 3d 686 (2010). In the elections since these
court decisions, spending by outside groups has risen to the
point that outsider advertising outpaces candidate spending
in some of the closest races (Fowler and Ridout 2014). Does
this more crowded environment mean that candidates have
lost control of their campaigns?
The independent expenditure groups, mostly super PACs
and so-called dark money groups (those with undisclosed
donors, usually social welfare organizations organized under
section 501[c][4], [5], or [6] of the Internal Revenue Service
code) that have taken on a larger role in recent elections are
viewed by many scholars as integrated pieces of a broader
party network (Herrnson 2009; Koger, Masket, and Noel
2009; Skinner, Masket, and Dulio 2012). Candidates, parties,
and outside groups within these networks all share an in-
terest in electoral success and should cooperate with one
another to the degree that campaign law will allow (Dwyre
and Kolodny 2014; Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2007).1
Recent studies of independent group advertising have found
that these actors tend to cooperate with candidates by em-
phasizing the same issues as the advertising of the candidates
they support (Franz 2014; Franz, Fowler, and Ridout 2016).
This study posits that the various actors within these party
networks are more sophisticated when it comes to the posi-
tive or negative sentiment of advertising, and that they en-
gage in a compensatory style of cooperation by dividing the
labor of attack. Using a data set created by merging existing
data of congressional advertising from the Wesleyan Media
Project with television ratings data from Nielsen, this study
shows that candidates have a lower proportion of their own
advertising devoted to attack when they benefit from more
outside group attacks on their opponent. This division of labor
allows candidates to reduce attacks that carry the risk of pub-
lic backlash and instead run more positive, self-promoting
advertising.
Kenneth M. Miller (kenneth.miller@unlv.edu) is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV 89154.
Original data for this study come from Nielsen and from the Wesleyan Media Project (WMP). The WMP is a collaboration between Wesleyan Uni-
versity, Bowdoin College, and Washington State University and includes media tracking data from Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington,
DC. The Wesleyan Media Project was sponsored in 2012 by grants from the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nielsen, the Wesleyan
Media Project, Knight Foundation, MacArthur Foundation or any of its affiliates. Earlier versions of this manuscript were presented at the annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2017, and at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, April 2016. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in the JOP Dataverse (https://
dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An online appendix with supplementary material is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1086/703133.
1. Direct coordination between candidates, independent expenditure arms of party committees, and independent expenditure groups is prohibited by
Federal Election Commission (FEC) rules: 11 C.F.R. §109.20(a) (2004).
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The rise of new actors and the successful absorption of
these actors’ activities into a cohesive team effort suggests the
emergence of a new system of network-centered campaigns
with features different from the candidate-centered campaigns
of the last several decades. Cooperation between candidates,
parties, and independent expenditure groups reveals how party
networks operate in elections.
A division of labor by candidates and outside groups would
be an interesting but unimportant story if there were no con-
sequences for democratic deliberations. But when a greater
responsibility for attack advertising is shifted to super PACs
and dark money groups, the types of attacks change. Outside
groups often have policy goals and a less candidate-specific per-
spective than candidates. Because of these differences, outside
groups compared to candidates are more likely to air policy-
based instead of personal attacks. Contrary to concerns that
outside groups, who are unaccountable to voters, will degrade
the quality of campaign discourse, when outside groups par-
ticipate in campaigns the attacks in the campaigns become
more policy based and less focused on attacks on candidates’
personal characteristics.
THE RISK AND REWARD OF ATTACK ADVERTISING
In any campaign advertisement, the sponsor chooses to air
attack messaging about the opponent, advocacy messaging
about the supported candidate, or often a combination of
both. While candidates may profess to prefer mostly positive
campaigns, campaign professionals are confident that attack
advertising works (Abbe et al. 2001; Kern 1989; Theilmann
and Wilhite 1998). Political science has offered some support
for this view, finding that under certain conditions attack ad-
vertising can affect vote choice (Ansolabehere and Iyengar
1995; Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Mattes and Redlawsk 2014;
but for a dissenting assessment see Lau, Sigelman, and Rovner
[2007]). Attack advertising may have greater persuasive power
than advocacy because individuals tend to give greater at-
tention to negative information (Baumeister et al. 2001),
and individuals are more likely to recall and use negative in-
formation when evaluating candidates (Lau 1985). Given
these features, attack advertising is a very appealing tool for
campaigns.
Campaigns are most likely to attack opponents when elec-
toral success is threatened. As a race gets more competitive,
candidates are increasingly willing to attack their opponent,
and when candidates are lagging behind their opponent they
are more likely to engage in attacks (Damore 2002; Kahn and
Kenney 1999; Lau and Pomper 2004; Theilmann and Wilhite
1998). Challengers have an incentive to attack incumbents in
order to redefine the officeholder and erode his or her support
(Geer 2006; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Lau et al. 2007; Tinkham
and Weaver-Lariscy 1995), while incumbents are incentivized
to rely on more advocacy messages to promote their accom-
plishments in office (Goldstein et al. 2001). Attack advertising
can also be retaliatory, where candidates attack as a response
to opponent attacks (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Damore
2002; Haynes and Rhine 1998; Lau and Pomper 2004). Finally,
multicandidate contests feature less attack advertising. In a
multicandidate race, eroding support for one candidate may
push those voters to another opponent, so the calculus for a
candidate in deciding to attack is more complex and has a less
certain payoff (Hansen and Pedersen 2008; Walter 2014).
Campaigns also have disincentives to attack opponents.
First, attack advertising carries potential risk for the spon-
sor. Attacks might be considered out of bounds, unfair, or un-
acceptable by voters. Numerous studies have found a back-
lash effect from attack advertising, where viewers of attack ads
lower their evaluations of the attacker instead of the target of
the message (Allen and Burrell 2002; Brooks and Murov 2012;
Dowling and Wichowsky 2015; Garramone 1985; Garramone
and Smith 1984; Lau et al. 2007). Second, campaigns must still
balance multiple communications objectives in their adver-
tising. Besides attacking opponents, campaigns seek to define
their own candidates in favorable terms to voters. Advocacy
messages frame the candidate in the preferred context and
reduce voters’ uncertainty about candidates (Alvarez 1997; Al-
varez and Franklin 1994; Shea and Burton 2006). Advertising
time spent attacking the opponent is time not spent making
the case for the supported candidate, so campaigns should seek
a balance of both attack and advocacy messages in the adver-
tising mix.
CAMPAIGN ACTORS AND COOPERATION
The advertising landscape is further complicated by the dra-
matically increased role of outside groups since 2010 (Fowler
and Ridout 2012). The primary division of campaign actors
is between candidates and outside groups. Outside groups are
composed of party groups and three varieties of independent
groups: party-adjacent groups that, like party groups, pursue
legislative majorities; issue-based groups that advance policy
objectives through replacing opponents and defending allies;
and single-candidate groups, formed to support a single can-
didacy (more information about how groups were coded is
included in the appendix, available online).2 Parties and party-
2. Party groups in federal legislative races are almost entirely made up
of the four Hill committees: the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(DSCC), National Republican Senate Committee (NRSC), Democratic Con-
gressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and National Republican Con-
gressional Committee (NRCC). Hill committees typically have two separate
entities: a coordinated campaign component that gives strategic advice to
candidates and an independent expenditure component that produces and airs
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adjacent groups, in particular, but all outside groups in gen-
eral are rational and pragmatic in their decisions of which
candidates to support (Magleby 2014; Miller 2017). These
groups seek electoral victory and in as many contests as pos-
sible, thus they should prefer to cooperate with candidates
as best they can.
The picture of how campaign actors cooperate with one
another and provide advance signals of one another’s activities
is based on numerous accounts in press, scholarly studies, and
a set of eight open-ended one-on-one interviews conducted in
June and July 2015 with individuals with direct experience in
the current campaign landscape. The interview participants
include: a former senior official from the DSCC, a television
executive responsible for advertising sales to political clients
in over a dozen major media markets, two campaign consul-
tants both with extensive experience in US House and Senate
races (one Democrat and one Republican), a Democratic poll-
ster, a Democratic campaign manager, a senior official from a
Republican-aligned party-adjacent super PAC, and an official
from an issue-based group. Respondents were recruited via
email based on referrals from previous respondents. The semi-
structured interviews were conducted “on background,” since
the interviews covered potentially sensitive topics of cam-
paign strategy and techniques that push the limits of FEC
regulations.
Campaign actors can cooperate without crossing the legal
threshold of coordination by communicating with one an-
other before the communications ban goes into effect (when
the candidate files with the FEC to officially become a can-
didate) and by sending out cues to one another, through the
use of public information and because actors have formed
reliable expectations of how the other actors will behave. Some
techniques of signaling and cooperation may appear to push
or surpass the limits of FEC rules, but campaign actors have
little reason to be timid. The FEC often fails to issue any guid-
ance to campaign actors because of a frequent partisan dead-
lock of 3–3 among FEC commissioners when groups request
advisory opinions (Corrado 2014), leading FEC chairwoman
Ann M. Ravel to tell one reporter, “The likelihood of the laws
being enforced is slim. . . . People think the FEC is dysfunc-
tional. It’s worse than dysfunctional” (Lichtblau 2015).3
Parties and independent expenditure groups openly com-
municate their intentions and their spending through press
releases that announce media buys and websites that feature
lists of targeted contests (Dwyre and Kolodny 2014). In ad-
dition, other less formal methods are now used by campaign
actors to share strategic information with outside groups: a
stand-alone corporation was created on the Republican side
to disseminate opposition research among both candidates
and independent expenditure groups while remaining com-
pliant with FEC rules (Confessore 2014); Twitter accounts were
created on both sides to share polling information across party,
candidate, and independent groups (Blumenthal 2014; Moody
2014); and Democratic candidates and the DSCC both posted
“important messages” on their websites to highlight issues that
were soon taken up by ads from Senate Majority PAC and
Patriot Majority USA (Sullivan 2014). The political director
for a party-adjacent super PAC interviewed for this project
stated that his group rarely makes media buys but instead
shares information and coordinates efforts among indepen-
dent allies during a campaign through research and regular
conference calls with independent groups participating in the
race. “We wanted to be point men and make sure there isn’t
overlap.”4 So, while the communications ban prevents coor-
dination between candidates and outside groups, outside
groups can and (at least occasionally) do coordinate with one
another.
Even if these signaling methods fail, the various cam-
paign actors can easily track one another’s media activity
during the campaign. Candidates learn of the support from
outside groups before the supporting ads air, receiving warn-
ing sometimes days, and many times weeks or even months,
in advance. According to interview respondents both in the
television industry and in campaign management, media buy-
ing firms provide weekly and sometimes daily reports of
other media buys in relevant markets.5 Thanks to these reg-
ular reports, campaign actors are aware of advertising by
other actors in the race well in advance of the ads running
on air. A Republican campaign consultant remarked that so
much information, including ad buys, is public that running
campaigns in this environment is “like playing poker with
the cards face up.”6
Finally, campaign actors can synchronize their efforts be-
cause actors’ behavior is predictable. Campaign staff, Hill com-
mittee leadership, and independent group leaders frequently
swap roles and have all learned their craft in the same arena.
Campaign professionals expressed confidence in outside ac-
3. Ravel later resigned in frustration from the FEC in February 2017.
4. Author interview with super PAC official, June 29, 2015.
5. Author interviews with television media executive, July 9, 2015, and
Democratic campaign manager, July 10, 2015.
6. Author interview with Republican campaign consultant, June 26,
2015.
political messages in races. The independent expenditure arm of the Hill
committee cannot communicate with candidates, nor with the coordinated
campaign. Each component cuts off communication with the other a few
months before the election. The independent expenditure arms of Hill com-
mittees are what are referred to here.
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tors in campaigns because they are “pros” or “veterans.”7 Since
they all know the same strategies, they can properly inter-
pret the moves of other actors. In addition, some actors have
reputations for specific tendencies. In particular, respon-
dents from both candidate campaigns and independent ex-
penditure groups stated that outside groups are expected to
“carry the negative,” that is, candidates expect that outside
groups will run almost entirely attack advertising and take
over some of the responsibility of attack on behalf of the
candidate.8
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Candidates, parties, and independent groups face a challenge
of how to work cooperatively in a campaign despite different
levels of familiarity with one another and prohibitions on di-
rect communication. But press accounts and author interviews
with campaign professionals paint a picture of actors that are
able to anticipate and communicate despite these challenges.
In particular, interviews suggest that candidate campaigns
look to outsource part of the job of attacks on the opponent.
Williamson (1975) offered a general theory of markets and
hierarchies to describe when an organization (in this case, a
candidate’s campaign for office) will internalize functions or
outsource them to others. Frequent, costly, and uncertain trans-
actions that cannot easily be transferred aremore likely to take
place internally where direct control is possible within a hi-
erarchy; whereas transactions that are straightforward and
nonrepetitive, as well as those that don’t require transaction-
specific investments, will be outsourced to others or to the
market (Powell 1990; Williamson 1975, 1985).
Prior to changes in campaign finance regulations that in-
creased the prominence of outside advertisers, candidates in-
ternally controlled the bulk of the advertising in their cam-
paign. However, attacks carry risk of backlash, and a candidate
also needs to dedicate some advertising to establishing name
recognition and making her own case for her candidacy, so
outsourcing has some appeal for candidates. The 2010 Citi-
zens United and Speechnow.org court decisions made trans-
ferring tasks easier, since it effectively created a new class of
outside groups who are free to advertise as much as they
desire within the limits of their own fund-raising. Interview
respondents from both the candidate side and independent
expenditure group side remarked that attack advertising can
be easier than supportive advertising for outside groups to
create when coordination with the candidate is prohibited.
A Democratic campaign consultant said that supportive ad-
vertising by outside groups is still rare further down the bal-
lot from the presidential race because “even today b-roll is
still hard to come by on most Senators and especially House
members.”9
But the current relationship between allied groups oper-
ating in a campaign and the candidate committee does not
function as a market, characterized by self-interested, nonco-
operative actors making “risky exchanges among strangers”
(Jung and Lake 2011, 973; Powell 1990). This outsourcing is
instead more of a cooperative relationship among allies. The
form of organization described by campaign professionals
more closely fits the definition of a network where a “col-
lection of actors . . . pursue repeated, enduring exchange re-
lations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legiti-
mate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes
that may arise during the exchange” (Polodny and Page 1998,
59). A network is a middle ground between a market or hier-
archy where actors match complementary strengths and make
interdependent choices (Powell 1990). Networks are further
characterized by reciprocity, trust, mutual understanding of
norms, and a “spirit of goodwill” in the relationship (Dore
1983; Granovetter 1995).
Candidates would likely prefer a hierarchical organiza-
tion with the candidate at the top, directing the advertising
decisions of groups who choose to support them. But pro-
hibitions on communication prevent such a relationship, and
independent groups often have their own broader goals. So
these actors instead comprise a network form of organiza-
tion where reputation, expertise, and expectations of reciproc-
ity guide actors’ decisions.
Advertising totals in the 2010 Kentucky Senate race, shown
in figure 1, illustrate how candidates might adjust their ad-
vertising when they anticipate that outsiders will carry the
negative. The top half of the figure displays the volume of
advertising and proportion of attack and advocacy by the
candidates, while the bottom half of the figure displays the
total advertising for each campaign—that is, the total of can-
didate advertising plus all advertising supporting that can-
didate by outside groups. First for the candidates, Rand Paul
appeared to run a more positive campaign—he attacked Con-
way with 47% of his advertising while Conway attacked him
with 77% of his ad volume. However, moving down to the
bottom half of the figure we see that including the outside
group support into the total advertising changes this picture.
Both campaigns devoted nearly identical proportions of adver-
tising to attacking the opponent (84% and 85%, respectively).
7. Author interviews with Republican campaign consultant, June 26,
2015, and Democratic campaign manager, July 10, 2015.
8. Author interviews with Republican and Democratic campaign con-
sultants, June 26, 2015, and July 10, 2015.
9. Author interview with Democratic campaign consultant, July 10,
2015.
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This should be a broad pattern across legislative campaigns.
Many voters do not connect candidates to attack advertising
by outside groups (Dowling andWichowsky 2015). Because of
this disconnect, candidates can escape backlash from attacks
if the attack is made by outside groups on behalf of the can-
didate instead of by the candidate’s own committee (Brooks
and Murov 2012; Dowling and Wichowsky 2013; Weber,
Dunaway, and Johnson 2012). Therefore, in a well-functioning
network there should be an inverse association between out-
side group attacks and the candidate’s attacks:
Compensatory attack hypothesis: The greater the
volume of attack advertising by supporting outside
groups in a campaign, the lower the proportion of attack
advertising by the candidate in that campaign.
All attack ads are not alike. Attacks can be based on issues
and policies or on personal aspects of the candidates. While
personal attacks are often considered a distasteful tactic in
campaign communications, policy-based attacks are usually
acceptable to viewers (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Mattes and
Redlawsk 2014). Furthermore, policy-based attacks can be
more beneficial to democratic discourse than positive ad-
vertising, since attacks carry more information about issues
and candidate positions (Geer 2006).
In a network, candidates should cooperate with outside
groups and have expectations about the support they will
receive, but candidates do not have control over outside ad-
vertisers as they would in a hierarchical relationship. Candi-
datesmight prefer that personal attacks on opponents bemade
by outside groups so that the candidate will be insulated from
public backlash against these more distasteful attacks.
But a recent study of independent advertising in the 2012
presidential campaign concluded that voters did not consider
ads by outside groups more negative or more misleading than
ads from the candidates (Dowling and Miller 2014). Outside
groups have different perspectives and incentives than can-
didates. Issue-based groups are formed around policy goals
and will likely focus on their issues of interest in their ad-
vertising. For example, the Sierra Club will be more likely to
attack a candidate’s environmental record than a candidate’s
honesty. Because of the groups’ objectives, we might instead
expect these groups to be the most likely to base their attacks
on policy considerations. Parties and party-adjacent groups
have broader agendas than issue-based groups, but they may
prefer to emphasize the top issues for the national party,
using nearly identical advertising across numerous races—
for example, “voted with Nancy Pelosi 95% of the time”
(Memmott 2010). In essence, groups with broader perspec-
tives than a single campaign (outside groups other than single-
candidate groups) will have more policy-oriented agendas
and not concern themselves with the minutiae of the personal
characteristics of each individual opponent.
Outside agendas hypothesis: Outside groups will be
more likely than candidates to engage in policy-based
attacks.
Finally, the type of attacks may vary based on the groups’
organizational forms. One recent study finds that groups
with undisclosed donors are more likely than groups with
disclosed donors to make expenditures in opposition to can-
didates than in support of candidates (Chand 2017). Perhaps
dark money groups are also more likely to attack on personal
grounds since their donors are fully shielded from any back-
lash. Furthermore, many 501(c) issue-based groups with un-
disclosed donors are authentic social welfare groups such as
the Sierra Club or the Humane Society, with members inter-
ested in advancing an issue more so than influencing elections.
Party-adjacent dark money groups, however, generally orga-
nize as 501(c)s in order to offer their donors anonymity (e.g.,
Americans for Prosperity or Crossroads GPS). Among party-
adjacent and issue-based independent groups the level of
transparency may be associated with both their sensitivity to
Figure 1. Portion of ad volume devoted to attack, Kentucky Senate 2010
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backlash and the authenticity of their commitment to a de-
clared issue interest and thus may be associated with the
frequency of their use of personal attacks against candidates.
DATA
The campaign advertising data used here come from the
Wesleyan Media Project (WMP) for the 2010 and 2012 elec-
tion cycles (Fowler, Franz, and Ridout 2014, 2015). TheWMP
captures and codes all airings of political advertisements on
broadcast television in all 210 media markets in the United
States. This study includes the broadcast campaign adver-
tising by all campaign actors in federal legislative races in the
general election phase. In all, 2,382,138 airings of political
advertisements by 751 House and Senate candidates and
232 outside groups are included. Furthermore, this study
takes the additional step of accounting for the differences in
the audience size of advertising airings occurring in different
markets and at different times of day. Using television au-
dience data obtained from Nielsen, each airing is expressed
as the size of the media market (in thousands of television
households) times the average portion of television house-
holds viewing broadcast television in the daypart when the
ad aired (see the appendix for a detailed description of this
process and an evaluation of the impact of using this mea-
surement instead of a count of airings).
The WMP records if ads are contrast, promote, or attack
spots. Using this information, the proportion of campaign
actors’ advertising volume dedicated to attack of opponents
is calculated (see the appendix for a full description of how
all variables were calculated). Consistent with previous studies
(Fowler and Ridout 2012, 2014), outside groups devote much
more of their advertising volume to attacking opponents
compared to candidates’ advertising (see table 1). There is
some variation between groups and election years, but broadly
speaking, candidates average about 45%–50% of advertising
devoted to attack while outside groups average about 85%–
90%of advertising devoted to attack. Total campaigns, the sum
of all advertising by candidates as well as supporting outside
groups, dedicate about two-thirds of advertising to attacking
opponents.
ANALYSES
Cross-sectional models
The compensatory attack hypothesis expects that the per-
centage of candidate advertising devoted to attack in a cam-
paign will have a negative association with outside group
supporting attacks. Cross-sectional models are estimated for
the percentage of a candidate’s advertising volume attacking
opponents, separately for Senate and House campaigns. This
relationship should be driven by expectations among trusted
and familiar actors in a network and by signals unobserved in
the advertising data (e.g., advertising buys appearing on FEC
reports weeks before the spots air, or press releases from
groups announcing intended or recent ad buys). If these are
the means of cooperation between campaign actors, then an
inverse relationshipmay not be observed in a lagged analysis,
but it will still be present in a cross-sectional analysis of the
total sum of advertising in campaigns.
The unit of analysis in the models is the campaign, defined
as the total advertising activity of the candidate and all outside
allies in support of the candidate in the general election phase
of the race. Campaigns are included if the candidate ran 50 or
more television spots and if the candidate had an opponent
(Senate: N p 119; House: N p 632).10
The dependent variable in themodels is the candidate attack
percentage—that is, the proportion of a candidate’s advertising
volume devoted to attacking the opponent(s). The independent
variable of interest, supporting attacks, is measured as the total
volume of attacks on behalf of the candidate by all outside
groups (parties, party-adjacent groups, issue-based groups, and
single-candidate groups) divided by the candidate’s total ad-
vertising volume. Expressing supporting attacks as a ratio of
the candidate’s advertising volume accounts for varying sizes
of campaigns, since candidates should only be interested in
Table 1. Percentage of Advertising Attacking Opponents
Senate House
2010 2012 2010 2012
Candidates 50 40 58 44
Parties 82 84 94 89
Party-adjacent groups 97 92 94 93
Issue-based groups 90 87 92 77
Single-candidate groups 70 99 99 98
Total campaign advertising 63 57 71 67
10. The sample is restricted to those campaigns where the candidate
aired 50 or more spots because with so little of their own advertising, there
would be insufficient “room” for candidates with less advertising to alter
their mix of advocacy and attack, and inflated supporting attack values
resulted from the candidates’ own paltry advertising volumes. As a result,
not included in the House sample are the 2010 Republican campaigns in
IL-11 and MN-8 and the 2012 Republican campaign in NC-7. Not in-
cluded in the Senate sample are the 2010 NY Senate races, since it proved
too difficult to reliably account for which candidate was supported by a
given advertisement. To ensure that the results were unaffected by
dropping these cases, the model was estimated with their inclusion and the
results were almost entirely unaffected.
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adjusting the advertising mix when the outside support is at a
volume that is meaningful in their race.
The overall mix of advertising sentiment by candidates and
the volume of attack advertising from outside groups sup-
porting candidates is shown in figure 2. Since so many legis-
lative seats are safe in any election, it is no surprise that many
candidates aired no attack messages at all in their television
campaigns (24 Senate campaigns and 191 House campaigns,
shown in the top row of fig. 2).11 However, 34 candidates in
House races and two in the Senate devoted all of their adver-
tising to attacking their opponents. Within these extremes,
however, the distribution of attack/advocacy mixes by candi-
dates was highly variable. Such diverse mixes are possible since
candidates on average run about nine separate creative ex-
ecutions in House races and over 20 in Senate races.12 Out-
side groups aired no attacks at all in 39% of Senate and 53%
of House campaigns where candidates did air their own ad-
vertising and had highly variable levels of supporting attacks in
those races where they did support candidates.13
To isolate the independent effect of supporting outside
attacks on a candidate’s attack percentage the model must also
account for the other major determinants of a candidate’s
choice to attack the opponent. The most important deter-
minant is the state of the race, or the closeness of the campaign
and the candidate’s prospects for winning, represented by
race ratings in nine categories from the Rothenberg and
Gonzales Political Report from the first week of October in
each election year. The overall relationship between the stra-
tegic context of the race and a candidate’s percentage of at-
tack should be curvilinear: candidates in closer races will
be more likely to attack the opponent, while safe and hope-
less campaigns will attack less. Furthermore, candidates who
are behind should be more likely to attack than candidates
who are ahead. Folding the scale would fail to account for this
second effect. Therefore, the Rothenberg ratings are in-
cluded in the models as a set of eight dummy variables with
the safe seat category omitted.
The opposing attacks directed against a candidate are mea-
sured as the total advertising volume attacking the candidate
from all actors divided by the total volume of the candidate’s
own advertising. The status of the candidates as incumbents
or challengers or in open contests is included in the model as
two dummy variables (the omitted category is incumbent).
In a handful of Senate contests a viable independent can-
didate (a candidate who eventually received 15% or more of
the total vote) was also in the race. Since the strategy of at-
tacking opponents is less beneficial in a multicandidate con-
test than in a two-way contest, a dummy variable for can-
didates running in a three-way race is included in the Senate
model. Finally, because this is a pooled sample of 2010 and
Figure 2. Distribution of candidate attacks and supporting attacks
11. These candidates did not have any attacks in their advertising
despite having an opponent (i.e., none of the campaigns in the sample
were unopposed).
12. House 2010: mean p 10:2, SD p 6:7; House 2012: mean p 8:0,
SD p 4:9; Senate 2010: mean p 21:4, SD p 11:3; Senate 2012: mean p
22.3, SD = 9:5.
13. There were no cases in the sample of campaigns where outside
groups ran ads to support a candidate but the candidate herself ran none.
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2012 races, an indicator for the year of the election is in-
cluded in the models as a dummy variable for 2012.14
A fractional logit model is used for the cross-sectional
analysis because the dependent variable is a percentage. This
is a generalized linear model with a binomial distribution
and a logit link estimated with robust standard errors (Wool-
dridge 2011). This form is suited for a fractional response
variable since it allows the dependent variable to take on any
value between zero and one, including the boundary values,
and can accommodate the large portion of zeros in the de-
pendent variable (Papke and Wooldridge 1996).15 Models
are estimated separately for Senate and House campaigns.
The basic model to measure the association between sup-
porting outside attacks and candidates’ attack percentage
can be written as follows:
E(candattacki) p L
 
b0 1 b1supattacki 1 o
9
jp2
bjratingi
1 b10oppattacki 1 b11challengeri
1 b12openi 1 b13threewayi
1 b142012i
!
:
The estimates from this model for House and Senate races
are shown in table 2. Variables for the state of the race have
the anticipated association with candidate attacks, illustrated
by the marginal effects on the predicted candidate attack
percentage for each category of competitiveness in figure 3.16
As expected, the highest predicted proportions of attack ad-
vertising are for candidates slightly behind in the race, though
the predicted percentages of attack are similar for all candi-
dates within two categories of a toss-up race. Safe candidates
have the lowest predicted attack percentages, while their op-
ponents (hopeless candidates) are predicted to run a moderate
amount of attacks.
A greater volume of attack from the opponent is associ-
ated with a greater share of the candidate’s advertising going
toward attack, though the effect is significant only in a one-
tailed test in the Senate sample. No significant differences in
the level of attack were observed between incumbents, chal-
lengers, and open-seat candidates. The independent effect of
running in a three-way race, however, is strongly negative in
Table 2. Fractional Logit Models of Candidate
Attack Percentage
Independent Variable Senate House
Supporting attacks 2.422* 2.138**
(.181) (.056)
Category:
2 (nearly safe seat) 2.337*** 1.405***
(.616) (.215)
3 2.810*** 1.912***
(.538) (.255)
4 2.926*** 1.717***
(.539) (.219)
5 (toss-up) 2.811*** 1.792***
(.570) (.211)
6 2.990*** 1.854***
(.580) (.243)
7 2.380*** 2.111***
(.671) (.254)
8 2.072*** 1.499***
(.543) (.247)
9 (hopeless candidacy) 2.002* 1.032***
(.616) (.216)
Opposing attacks .2021 .123**
(.125) (.043)
Challenging candidate 2.088 .172
(.358) (.143)
Open-seat candidate 2.340 2.242
(.279) (.173)
Three-way race 21.326*** . . .
(.344)
2012 .181 2.552***
(.219) (.109)
Intercept 22.378*** 21.412
(.219) (.150)
N 119 632
Bayesian information criterion 2466.33 23,721.24
Log pseudo-likelihood 250.79 2290.24
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All two-tailed tests.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
14. The validity of pooling 2010 and 2012 is tested using Wald tests
on models fully interacted with year, provided in the appendix. No in-
dependent variable had a significantly different slope between years.
15. High frequencies of zeros or ones might suggest that a zero-one
inflated beta regression model would be appropriate, however such a model
assumes that the extreme values are a result of a process separate from that
generating other values of the dependent variable. Such a model is incon-
sistent with the theory of the data generating process offered here; however,
to ensure that the findings that follow are not dependent upon the choice of
a fractional logit model, the models were estimated using a zero-one inflated
beta model, a Tobit model, and ordinary least squares. The differences in
observed associations in these models are small and do not affect any
conclusions drawn in this study. These estimates are provided in the
appendix.
16. All marginal effects in this study are calculated with the contin-
uous variables held constant at their means and categorical variables at
their mode.
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Senate contests. When there are three viable candidates, the
candidates in those races run much less attack advertising.
House candidates, but not Senate candidates, were much less
likely to attack in 2012, perhaps because this was a redistricting
year and even incumbents needed to introduce themselves to
new electorates.
After controlling for these factors, the results of the models
support the compensatory attack hypothesis. A greater vol-
ume of supporting attacks from outside groups is negatively
associated with the percentage of attack advertising from the
candidate, in both Senate and House races. The marginal ef-
fects of outside group attacks on the candidate’s predicted mix
of attack and advocacy are shown in figure 4. The model
predicts that in Senate contests an increase of one standard
deviation in the supporting attack ratio is associated with a
decrease of candidate attacks of 8.3 percentage points. In
House races the relationship is smaller. An increase of one
standard deviation in the supporting attack ratio in House
contests is associated with a decrease of candidate attacks of
4.0 percentage points.17 These differences in proportion of
attack advertising by candidates are equivalent differences
that would be expected between a Senate candidate contest
that was two categories less competitive than a toss-up and a
House candidate contest that was one category less com-
petitive than a toss-up in the Rothenberg and Gonzales Race
Ratings.
Additional models interact several variables with sup-
porting attacks, shown in table 3. In these models the differ-
ence in the slopes shown in figure 5 between Democratic and
Republican campaigns approaches but does not reach the 95%
confidence threshold for statistical significance in the Senate
sample (x2 p 7:71, p p :052) but is statistically significant
in the House sample (x2 p 19:41, p ! :001). In the Senate,
Democratic candidates are predicted to air 11.7 percentage
points less attacks when there is one standard deviation in-
crease in supporting attacks (moving from a supporting ratio
of 0.54 to 1.46), while Republican candidates are predicted to
air 8.2 points less attacks over the same range. In the House the
difference is more stark. One standard deviation increase from
themean of supporting attacks (from 0.69 to 2.22) is associated
with 9.5 points less attacks by Democrats versus 2.8 points less
attacks by Republican candidates.
Supporting attacks by the parties were included together
with all other outside group attacks because the overwhelming
majority of advertising activity by parties is conducted by their
independent expenditure arms. These groups, like all other
varieties of independent groups, are prohibited from direct
communication or coordination with the candidates. It is pos-
sible, however, that parties and candidates can cooperate more
efficiently and the inverse relationship between candidates and
outside advertisers’ attacks is more pronounced when more
of that support is from the formal parties. To test for this
possibility cross-sectional models were estimated with a
variable for the proportion of outside group attacks coming
from parties versus other group types interacted with sup-
porting attacks. In this model, shown in columns 3 and 4
of table 3, a Wald test of the interaction did not find sig-
nificant differences (Senate: x2 p 2:50, p p :11; House:
x2 p 1:12, p p :29), meaning that the inverse relationship
Figure 3. Marginal effects of the state of the race. Numeric categories in figure correspond to numeric category variables in table 2
17. One standard deviation change of supporting attacks (Senate p
0.92; House = 1:53) starting from the variable’s mean (Senate =0.54;
House = 0:69).
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between outside group attacks and candidate attacks is not
stronger when outside supporting attacks come more or less
from parties versus other types of groups.
Finally, the interactive models examine differences in the
slope of the coefficient for supporting attacks between incum-
bents, challengers, and candidates in open-seat races in col-
umns 5 and 6 of table 3. Incumbents might be more tightly
networked with outside groups and thus the slopes may be
stronger. But significant differences are not observed between
incumbents and challengers. In the Senate sample, however,
the inverse association between supporting outside attacks and
the candidate’s proportion of attacks loses statistical signif-
icance within the subsample of open-seat candidates.
Panel models
The inverse relationship in the previous models between
candidate attack advertising and supporting attacks by out-
side groups is consistent with trusted relationships, signals,
and reciprocity in a network form of organization among
campaign actors. However, these patterns could also occur
if candidates simply react to unexpected support from in-
dependently minded outsiders by reducing their level of
attack in following weeks. If campaign actors have accurate
expectations of each others’ advertising efforts in campaigns,
then timing of when the advertising runs should be largely
irrelevant. A former Democratic Party operative emphasized
in an interview that “even if a committee hasn’t run an ad yet,
the reservations are public.”18 Thus, candidates should be able
to adjust their percentage of attack based on both past and
expected future advertising by supporting outside groups.
To examine whether candidates or outsiders simply re-
spond to ads after they run, the data are partitioned into
weekly blocks and linear fixed effects panel time series models
are estimated, shown in table 4.19 In these models candidate
attacks in a given week are a function of supporting attacks
and opposing attacks with both one- and two-week lags, and
supporting attacks are modeled as a function of candidate
attacks and opposing attacks with one- and two-week lags.
The other explanatory variables from the cross-sectional mod-
els, race rating, incumbent/challenger/open, three-way race,
and election year, are time invariant and thus their effects are
removed by these models.20 The functional form of the models
where the unit of analysis is each campaign (i) in each week (t)
is as follows:
candattackitp b1supattackit21 1 b2supattackit22
1 b3oppattackit21 1 b4oppattackit22
1 ai 1 εit:
suppattackit p b1candattackit21 1 b2candattackit22
1 b3oppattackit21 1 b4oppattackit22
1 ai 1 εit:
These models are estimated to assess an alternative ex-
planation that attack advertising by campaign actors is as-
Figure 4. Marginal effects of supporting attacks from outside groups
18. Author interview with super former Democratic Party operative,
July 10, 2015.
19. Stationarity of the dependent variables is verified with Fisher-type
unit-root tests (p ! :01 for each test).
20. The race ratings could vary, but Rothenberg rarely changed its
ratings of a race over the course of a campaign cycle, thus the race rating
had too little variation to be included as a time-variant explanatory var-
iable in these models.
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sociated with the level of attack by other actors in prior
weeks. The potential insight from thesemodels should not be
overstated, however. The theory offered in this study predicts
null findings from these models since candidates learn of the
support from outside groups before the supporting ads air and
with irregular warning—sometimes days, and many times
weeks or even months, in advance.21 In other words, while
the theory offered in this study proposes a dynamic process
between campaign actors, the dynamic should not be di-
rectly observable through the timing of when advertising
airs. These models are unable to extract causal effects from
endogenous data and are not estimated as a strategy of lag
identification (see Bellemare et al. 2017 for a discussion of
the limits of causal estimation possible with lagged explan-
atory variables).
If candidates exclusively react to supporting attacks in
prior weeks, then the coefficients for supporting attackst21
and supporting attackst22 should have negative associations
with the candidate attack dependent variable (cols. 1 and 2
of table 4). But the models find no relationship between the
percentage of candidate advertising devoted to attack in a
Table 3. Interaction Models of Candidate Attack Percentage
Independent Variable
Party % Party Support Incumbency
Senate
(1)
House
(2)
Senate
(3)
House
(4)
Senate
(5)
House
(6)
Supporting attacks 2.751* 2.343*** 2.648** 2.012 .090 2.219
(.361) (.080) (.210) (.098) (.409) (.074)
Republican .340 2.065 . . . . . . . . . . . .
(.311) (.132)
Republican # supporting attacks .275 .246** . . . . . . . . . . . .
(.291) (.085)
% party support . . . . . . 2.548 2.258 . . . . . .
(.509) (.211)
Party support # supporting attacks . . . . . . .568 2.157 . . . . . .
(.359) (.147)
Challenger 2.328 .183 .118 .173 .338 .120
(.412) (.153) (.391) (.145) (.419) (.173)
Open seat 2.540 2.237 2.145 2.270 2.270 2.4471
(.330) (.173) (.331) (.337) (.337) (.196)
Challenger # supporting attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.769* .071
(.388) (.076)
Open # supporting attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.386 .2481
(.371) (.130)
Intercept 22.585*** 21.386*** .427 .178 22.292*** 21.311***
(.489) (.166) (.548) (.230) (.481) (.150)
x2 test of interaction 7.711 19.41*** 2.50 1.12 6.29* 3.73
N 119 632 119 632 119 632
Bayesian information criterion 2438.06 23,711.26 2438.06 23,711.26 2427.56 23,365.76
Log pseudo-likelihood 249.80 2288.79 249.80 2288.79 247.32 2263.98
Note. Models calculated with full set of regressors. For compactness, only interactive components shown in table. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All
two-tailed tests.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
21. Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky (2017) caution that lagging ex-
planatory variables “will lead analysts working in the mainstream approach
to hypothesis testing to reject null hypotheses that are true and to find too
many estimates of causal effects that are spurious” (956). In this case a type
I error is of somewhat less concern than a type II error because the purpose
of these models is to verify that campaign actors do not simply respond in
time to one another.
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given week and the volume of outside group supporting at-
tacks in prior weeks.
Going in the other direction, if outside groups reduce
their volume of supporting attacks in response to the sup-
ported candidates airing more attacks, then coefficients for
candidate attackst21 and candidate attackst22 should have
negative associations with the supporting attack ratio (cols. 3
and 4 of table 4). The models find mixed evidence for such a
relationship. On the House side, more attack-oriented ad-
vertising by candidates in the prior two weeks is associated
with less supporting attacks from outsiders. Specifically, a
House candidate running 100% attacks in a week versus zero
Figure 5. Marginal effects of supporting attacks by party
Table 4. Fixed Effects Linear Models of Attacks
Independent Variable
DV: Candidate Attack DV: Supporting Attack
Senate
(1)
House
(2)
Senate
(3)
House
(4)
Supporting attackst21 .005 2.003 . . . . . .
(.004) (.005)
Supporting attackst22 2.001 .003 . . . . . .
(.007) (.005)
Candidate attackst21 . . . . . . 21.903 2.291*
(1.357) (.138)
Candidate attackst22 . . . . . . .273 2.348**
(1.287) (.132)
Opposing attackst21 .001 .009* .211** .733***
(.003) (.004) (.079) (.021)
Opposing attackst22 .003 .0091 2.002 2.254***
(.004) (.005) (.124) (.026)
Intercept .426*** .389*** 1.838** .413***
(.009) (.005) (.634) (.061)
N 1,012 3,531 822 2,547
Overall R2 .01 .03 .06 .53
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. All two-tailed tests. DV p dependent variable.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
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attacks is associated with about 30% less volume of sup-
porting attacks in following weeks (20.291 and20.348). On
the Senate side, however, no significant association is observed
between candidates’ attack percentage and supporting attacks
by outside groups.
Type of attack
When outside groups take on a larger role of attack in a cam-
paign, what impact does this have on the substance of the at-
tacks in the race? The outside agendas hypothesis expects that
while outsiders are better positioned to make personal attacks,
their own internal characteristics will instead make themmore
likely to emphasize policy matters in their attacks. A straight-
forward evaluation of this hypothesis is to compare the pro-
portions of attack advertising by each group devoted to per-
sonal attacks versus policy-based attacks. The percentage of
attacks based on personal attributes is also examined be-
tween dark money groups and groups with disclosed donors.
Single-candidate groups were not included here since they
represented only a trivial amount of advertising in the 2010
and 2012 congressional elections.
Table 5 shows the percentage of all attacks for each cat-
egory of actors that were on personal characteristics versus
policy matters. Because these percentages reflect the pro-
portion of personal attacks in all attack advertising by each
category of actor, all differences are significant at p ! :001 in
two-tailed proportions tests.
Candidates (30% Senate, 28% House) followed by parties
(27% Senate, 21% House) were the most likely campaign
actors to base their attacks on personal characteristics in-
stead of policy considerations. Issue-based independent groups
rarely made personal attacks (all issue-based groups combined:
9% Senate, 14% House), but even party-adjacent groups with
both disclosed and undisclosed donor support made mostly
policy-based attacks against opponents when compared to
candidates (all party-adjacent groups combined: 15% Senate,
13% House). Furthermore, while the differences were modest,
dark money groups were less likely than transparent groups to
air personal attacks. These findings offer support for the out-
side agendas hypothesis, as outside groups of all varieties and
independent groups in particular (both dark money and
transparent) were more likely than candidates to engage in
policy-based attacks. In House contests but not in Senate
races, anonymously funded party-adjacent groups were the
least likely to use personal attacks (7%).
The difference in types of attacks by different groups sug-
gests that campaigns with greater independent group activity
are more policy focused, not less. However it is also possible
that, just as with the mix of attack versus advocacy, an inverse
association is present in the type of attacks by campaign actors.
To look for evidence of such an association, a model was es-
timated with the percentage of a candidate’s attacks based on
personal characteristics as the outcome variable. No associa-
tion was found between the proportion of personal attacks by
candidates and outside supporting policy-based attacks (full
model results provided in the appendix). So candidate adver-
tising does not feature more personal attacks in campaigns
where outside groups’ attacks are more policy based. Thus,
when outside groupsmakemore attacks in a campaign overall,
advertising in that campaign tends to be more policy based.
CONCLUSION
This study has offered a theory of how the network form of
organization of candidates, parties, and outside groups enables
campaigns to coherently manage their efforts despite legal
barriers to communication. Holding other factors constant,
the proportion of attack advertising by a candidate is inversely
associated with the volume of attack advertising supporting
that candidate. This observed relationship is consistent with
statements from campaign professionals in interviews that
candidates expect outside groups to attack on their behalf. In
addition, the combination of weak findings in panel models
and significant relationships in cross-sectional models is con-
sistent with cooperation between campaign actors occurring
through legal communication and the use of publicly available
ad buy data. It is also due to reliable expectations of each
other’s strategies, rather than adjustments made after the ob-
served occurrence of ads airing.
An important caveat to these findings is that if candidates,
parties, and other outside groups effectively cooperate as
Table 5. Attacks on Personal Characteristics
Senate House
%
Personal
Attacks
No. of
Attack
Ads
%
Personal
Attacks
No. of
Attack
Ads
Candidates 30 431,848 28 435,004
Parties 27 190,285 21 293,861
Transparent party-adjacent
groups 16 67,511 18 42,627
Dark party-adjacent groups 14 85,477 7 29,747
Transparent issue-based
groups 9 45,518 19 36,491
Dark issue-based groups 8 38,875 11 63,219
Note. Total airings of ads with attack content. Percentages indicate propor-
tion of attacks based on personal characteristics. Single-candidate groups are
excluded because of their trivial advertising volume.
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networked actors in the mix of attack and advocacy adver-
tising, it is through a dynamic process that is only indirectly
observable though the campaign advertising data used here.
The analyses by themselves do not demonstrate a causal re-
lationship of outside attack advertising on candidates’ adver-
tising mix.
When outside groups take on more of the load of attacks in
a campaign, the policy content of advertising in campaigns
increases. This could be because personal attacks are more
customized attacks that require more localized knowledge.
Another possibility is that even party-adjacent outside groups
are motivated by policy interests, and they prefer to champion
those policy perspectives in their advertising. Since candidates
are the most likely campaign actors to engage in personal
attacks, this also suggests that backlash is not a major con-
sideration in the choice to attack opponents on personal versus
policy grounds.
Finally, these findings inform some normative concerns
about independent group advertising in congressional races.
When outsiders are attacking candidates, the attacks are more
likely to be of the type that citizens have judged to be fair game
in campaigns. Outsiders are more attack oriented than can-
didates, but the ratio of attack advertising for candidates is
biased downward by safe candidates running purely advocacy
spots in their contests. Furthermore, because greater attack
advertising by outsiders is associated with less by candidates,
the net effect of outside group attack advertising on the neg-
ativity of the campaign is partially muted.22 These findings do
not mitigate concerns about the lack of accountability of in-
dependent group advertising and of the distortive effect of un-
limited independent expenditures. And the conclusions here
are based solely on television advertising and do not include
other forms of mass communication such as robocalls, direct
mail, and web ads that may carry more vitriolic messages by
various groups. But at least in terms of advertising sentiment
and the substance of attacks on the still-dominant form of cam-
paign communication—television—the increased role of in-
dependent groups in campaigns has not had a corrosive effect
on campaign discourse.
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